Timo Kinnunen
Särkiniementie 16 A 41
70700
Kuopio
Finland
I have made some new arrangements in my study, namely, I have embedded some internal linking within this document, and therefore I can offer the whole stuff as a pleasant continuum, and you can move easily in the document by links. Then I have made some corrections to words which I have written grammatically wrong, and therefore this version is (may be) the valid one. I have the full copyright to this work, of course, but you can read this as much as you will, but if you want to refer this work somehow, please, ask me first. I tried to offer this as a doctoral thesis few years ago, but most of those Besser-Wisser -like Jyvaeskylae university people were not interested in this, and therefore it is up to you to evaluate this. But do not tell me what you may think of this, or if YOU are not interested in this, or if you consider this as nonsense. If you like this - good - but if you don't, just drop this out, and try to find other explanations, and point of views. However, I have not made the complete internal linking, that is, there are no all the possible internal, and external links, but you can imagine what kind they might be, if made available. This work has been made with computers, and therefore addressed to them, too. I have used HTML tags instead European extended characters, and therefore you can read this with most browsers in most operating systems. This version uses tags as lowercase.
Click here to study a chapter Idealism and pragmatism
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[1]
At a first glance, every ism appears to us as an unit, and compact, and as such, as a kind of a continuum (1) in spite of the fact that all of them are inclined e.g . (2) divide the world into the two separate portions, and with their special tools we can prove, and also recognize only one of them as true one. But then there can be also other conflicts - as a result - which cannot be solved at all. And there can be still several questions in their silent, and never-found grave, which, perhaps, are never raised up - because of the fact that they would break the illusion of unity, if ever solved.
But still those isms can be considered as active participants of complex unity, namely of human mind, which is a continuously enlarging, and explosive phenomenon. By this kind of continuity, say, idealism (3), for example, seems to become capable to see materialism (4) as an antithesis of it, and as restricted interpretation, notwithstanding that idealism cannot falsify materia of the world - as it is - in its way of being - whether it had got its existence due of our disinterpretation, or was its inner nature nothing but nonsense, or completely dead structure. But regarded as a component of human mind, there is no need to deny that very presence of materia in the world, because it is a kind of packed idea, or stored energy, or dead mind - as we shall get to know mind interpreted by C.S Peirce. In fact, idealism doesn't insist that there are no material things but it tries to claim that these are not as true as infinite ideas are. This is also according C.S. Peirce's interpretation.
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1. ( Continuum : The term used by C.S. Peirce ; c.f. his terms of percipuum , ponecipuum , and antecipuum .)
2. ((L.) Exempli gratia (abbreviation = e.g.): For example, for instance.)
3. ( Idealism : The system of thought in which object of external perception is held to consist of ideas [in various senses].)
4. ( Materialism : An [philosophical] opinion that nothing exists but matter and its movements and modifications and that consciousness and will are wholly due to material agency.)
[2]
And Idealism insists further, that ideas we actually have are derived from infinite ideas - a kind of shadows on the wall of our cave. And this is just admitting that a portion of the world is something else than pure ideas - that is - our reality consists of things which are vague, and dim, and which prevent us to see the truth. This is how Plato (1) described them - hence, the term Platonism (2). Thus we can say that idealism is just arguing for that man with his world is a kind of shadow on the wall, and that there is a real world behind out there .
This hypothesis is not solving the problem of the meaning of our lives, or giving an explanation and relief for our angst, or explanation of the purpose, or goal of all our struggles as mankind, or specie within species, etc. J.P. Fell (NOTES 1) has written that far before Plato philosophers regarded ideas as the forms of the presence of physis, and they hold that aletheia was the carrier of ideas. But Plato regarded ideas just as absolute an eternal. We do not know in detail how Plato actually got this interpretation, and what he actually meant by it, but we might say that by the process since then both textual and contextual have been covered with enduring facts, or ideas, which were aimed to explain both of these spheres, from the point of ideas. But since them an emphasis of an explanation, and an interpretation of the world has been migrated into a sphere, which is something in itself, and from where our reality has been seen. And because of that, if we are true idealists, we must explain any case only trough ideas - and vice versa (3), if we are materialists, we must propose for that there is nothing but materia and its many forms.
If we argue something against materialism we suppose implicitly that there is a view, or a case, for or against which we can argue, or something to prove or disprove. Even if we want to deny something, we implicitly make a hypothesis, that we have real object, which we want to prove to be false , whatever that view, or a case has stood for, or is there something real in our world at all, for or against which we have argued. Anyway, we must regard something as true, when we are trying to prove something an illusion.
Martin Heidegger (NOTES 2) has written:
".. if the truth itself is an illusion, there is still some ground, by which it could be proved to an illusion ".
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1. (PLATO was the Greek philosopher, pupil of Socrates, and author of Dialogues based on the teaching of Socrates and the doctrines of Pythagoras; the principal of these dialogues were Protagoras , Gorgias , Parmenides , Theatetus , Sophist , and Philebus , Timaeus , Laws and the Apology . At his Symposium , Republic , Phaedrus , and Phaedo , he introduced his doctrine of that only the ideas are real, as well as the metaphora, according with the ideas, we actually have, are like shadows on the wall.)
2. ( Platonism : The philosophical system of PLATO, of which central conception is existence of a world of ideas, divine types, or forms of material objects, which ideas are alone real and permanent, while individual material things are but their ephemeral and imperfect imitations)
3. ((l.) Vice Versa : The order being reversed.)
[3]
If we consider the [whole] world per se (1) as a fiction, or illusion, or consisting illusory continuums, with which we do not have anything common, we cannot speak about the world at all, and about any general concepts either, by which to describe it. This is logical conclusion, and valid, too. But there might be no room for pure relativism (2), either, because there is no room for alternative, or other kinds of worlds within one kind of a totally imaginery world, which is an only and one. We may become advocates of dualism (3) if we admit that there might be two different kind of spheres in the world, or we may become an advocate of monism (4) if we think that there exists only one of these spheres, and within it all observable, thinkable, or imaginable things are valid, and within it the rest of it belong to nothingness, and any explanations which are derived from it are only false ideas about the monistic world. Then there must be error within it, and without error there is no sense to argue for a monistic world. How this is possible is an interesting thing - that in only and one there is something which does not actually belong to it, and one of the explanations is that we can make mistakes - even in totality and solid world. But we can choose also pluralism (5) which seems to avoid the confusion of the previous alternatives, but then we have only restricted validity at hand, and, perhaps, not at all universal truths.
If we suppose that only eternal ideas are true ones, we have the question from where we might get them, and which is the point of view to see them as they are. If we accept that Platonian interpretation, that our everyday experience is very faint form of ideas, and that most of our ideas are not at all valid ones, in respect to each others, or in respect to really true ones out there. If our interpretations of ideas do not resemble in any way to the really true ideas, which are undeniable - we have no use of those ideas, especially in our science and philosophy. Certainly it makes no sense to say that there are endlessly valid ideas out there , but we cannot get them. Sorry.
And if our ideas in science and philosophy were ultimately true, we should have no living companionship with them in our true everyday uses of language. Why. We have a very feeling that our ordinary life is interesting just because its variations, and not because of its command nature. If we are not able to get overlapping ideas, and if the only idea that we can get is - for example - that the world is split into two, as in dualistic view, or that we can grasp true meanings only unintentionally - as given - there might always be true that nothing but accurate perception, obedience, controversy, or comparison, can produce more knowledge, and it is not due that a part of the world were dealing with the truth than another part. But because of this dualism, there is always certain part of the world, which we cannot apprehend or comprehend, as it is, when seen and accepted from controversy, or from another point of view of an opposite ism .
But we cannot deny, were we advocates of this or that view, that there are other alternatives, too, which are equal to the view we advocate, when studying e.g. their [logical] formal structures, or that there exist several alternatives, and they do so, notwithstanding that we deny their truthfulness time after time. I think, that this suggest to that we have an illusory way of being, because we have not yet got any pure ideas, with which to make any other alternatives vanish, and because of this, the nature of our experience is quite illusory.
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1. ((L.) Per se : by itself; by its own nature.)
2. ( Relativism : The doctrine that knowledge is of relations only.)
3. ( Dualism : E.g. the doctrine of DESCARTES that mind and matter exist as distinct entities. In moral philosophy, dualism refers to the doctrine that there are two independent principles, good and evil.)
4. ( Monism : Any theory denying the duality of matter and the mind, as distinction from dualism and pluralism.)
5. ( Pluralism : The system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle.)
[4]
In that kind of split world, or plurality, we cannot prove any possible continuum as false one, because the continuums we can bring into our consciousness are not universally true ones, but instead somehow valid in themselves, or according their own internal ways of being. Hence, by them we cannot prove any of other continuums as absolutely false. But should we conclude from this that our own, familiar continuum, as well as those other ones, are not at all reliable, and that they never will be, notwithstanding that we have experienced something as being presence all the time, as well as we have survived with our weak understandings and intellect trough the all previous ages ? And does it mean, if we accept, say, idealism, as a true one, that our illusory experience do not have any firm meaning, and it does not make sense to talk about our everyday continuity and its continuums , or immediacy ? (1) Does this mean that all of our scientific arguments and achievements live their own life?
What does it mean that we can still discuss numerous false beliefs which are not like ours, or that we can set many isms to describe another points of view? Does it make sense to say that we cannot have any true ideas, or that we are continuously proving something to false by the ideas which we only believe to be true? What are we doing? The answer is, probably, that we are imitating truth, whatever it shall be at the end of the world, if we do not have any well-developed ideas like ad infinitum (2) at hand. But we cannot claim that we have done just nothing, either. We can have a very feeling that we are doing something, even when we are asleep, and we can be sure that something has happened, and caused results in certain part of reality, and we have not had this or that belief but instead the very feeling of their presence and immediacy. There will be arisen several what concerns dreaming or believing, as well as living, if we think that our everyday experience is just nothing, and that dreaming must be more less that it?
What are we actually doing with our faint facts in our everyday life, which is like an illusion? But is it such one? If we accept that those facts are valid ones, what are we actually doing in our dreams, or when believing to supernatural beings or eternal ideas? What are we doing when believing to be right? When we can claim that we have, at last, known exactly what is the phenomenon of believing, and what is its role in human understanding, and so on. There are no fundamental differences between different mental states, such e.g. waking and sleeping, from which C.S. Peirce (NOTES 3) has suggested that:
" When you sleep, you are not so largely asleep as your fancy that you be ".
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1. ( Immediacy : Our scientific observations have their fundamental basis in the world of immediate experience; every reading of any indicator ,or a meter is made by senses. We might to construct a measuring instrument, which were quite free from any disturbances of reading, and which were free of the restrictions of human senses, and which would just measure for itself, and make absolutely objective reports, and nothing less - but we should have any utility of it, because we are, and will stay, to, restricted beings, who make mistakes.)
2. ((L.) Ad infinitum : to infinity; and so on to its logical conclusion.)
[5]
Ludwig Wittgenstein (NOTES 4) argued in his late philosophy for, that somebody must have "teach us" something which is, and which can be considered - in the same time - as an steady rock bottom, and the foundation of our concepts and forms of life (1), which we can also regard as the final ground for communication. This sounds to me as synechism - but what for synechism stands as an alternative? The term in question has been derived by C.S. Peirce (NOTES 5) (who has derived many of his terms from ancient languages, e.g. from Latin and Greek. From the Greek word: sunecismoz - whose root is the word: sunechz - which means continuous. The one feature in it is that way of being continuous, but another feature, and not less important, is that way of being social. But there is a larger meaning, which has been produced by that English term synechism, which signifies to the general tendency in C.S. Peirce's philosophy to regard almost everything as continuous, and not as split. By the new term he considered especially the existing isms saying:
" for two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the stemwords signify. Thus materialism is the doctrine that matter everything, idealism is the doctrine that ideas are everything, and dualism is the philosophy which splits everything in two ".
C.S. Peirce (NOTES 6) has given us an information that he has been endeavoring to develope this idea a long time, and he has also written some of his results in The Monist . He insisted further that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it. Accordingly, every proposition, except so far as it relates to an unattainable limit of experience (which he has called by the term absolute) is to be taken with an indefinite qualification; for a proposition which has no relation whatever to experience is devoid all meaning. I think that we have just there an important feature at hand, namely, that we receive everything in a relatively vague state, and develop it further, until it has no special connections left in regard of the beginning of the process. I will emphasize just here that most philosophies have produced a lot of speculation on the true essence of the world, but we cannot rely on them because they are not yet developed into a state of being reliable.
However, I think that there are certain, perhaps originally human antitheses present, from which it is possible to mirror the unknown. Thus, on the one hand you can see (if you want to) the world as ideal in its nature, and on the other hand you can see it as material. But what about physicality and psychic phenomena?
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1. ( Forms of life : = Germ: Lebensformen . Also EDUARD SPANGER had a similar concept, and he wrote a book Lebensformen , in which he described how different types of persons have their own strategies, and how they have different goals of life, and there are presented e.g. social- political,- and religious forms of life [see. J.A. Hollo , Kasvatuksen maailma , pp. 134-135, 1952.)
[6]
C.S. Peirce (NOTES 7) wanted to root up also physical and psychical controversy insisting that all phenomena are such of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows them to be teleological or purposive. It is no wonder that C.S. Peirce (NOTES 8) has argued for that there is no fundamental difference between a self and another self (1). Then there is the question of larger personality. In seems obvious that C.S. Peirce (NOTES 9) has wanted to broad the barbaric conception of personal identity quoting a brahmanical hymn [which sentence can be found in Collected Papers ] as follows:
" I am that pure and infinitive Self, who am bliss, eternal, manifest, all-pervading, and who am the substrate of all that owns name and form ".
continuing that this expresses more than humiliation - the utter swallowing up of the poor individual self (2) in the spirit of prayer.
There is an evidence of that he might have derived some elements from hindu philosophy to his synechism, too. At Bhagavad-gita (NOTES 10) we find almost similar sentence than the quotation above, and at Veda we can read further that only the person who fully dedicates to worship the highest can understand him. This comes very close to the question concerning the role of man in the whole development of the universe - where C.S. Peirce (NOTES 11) has argued for that:
" all communication from mind to mind is trough continuity of being! A man is capable of having assigned him a rôle in the drama of creation (3), and so far as he loses himself in that rôle, -no matter how humble it may be, -so far he identifies himself with an author ".
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1. (We shall return to the question of the close relationship of self and another self later during the current study.)
2. ( Self : Cf. above pure and infinite Self, which, as a concept, has regarded important by G.H. MEAD - whose influence to JOHN DEWEY (E.g. "George Herbert Mead" 1931, 311) we shall discuss later in the current study. From those influences we have got also support from C.W. MORRIS (1932, chapter IV). But also W. JAMES (1952, 146-154) has described self in his Principles , as waves, current of thought, or a chain of past selves , which associates to C.S. Peirce 's conception of self, as something not-pre dermined; the spiritual development of self is due by a larger vision, which is beyond the current self (SCHEFFLER 1974, 86.)
3. ( Role , as a concept, has also an important "role" in G.H. MEAD 'S epistemology.)
[7]
There must also be discussion on the nature of immortality, to which C.S. Peirce (NOTES 12) has suggested to, when studying that possibility in carnal,- social,- and spiritual consciousness, and when referring to Edward Stanton 's (1) and Freytag 's (2) books for further information, when insisting that:
" synechism refuses to believe that when death comes, even the carnal consciousness ceases quickly. How it is to be, it is hard to say, in the all but entire lack of observational data! Here, as elsewhere the synechist oracle is enigmatic ... But further, synechism recognizes that the carnal consciousness is but a small part of a man. There is, in the second place, the social consciousness, by which a man's spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and having itself being very much longer than superficial observers think ... A man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole. This is an archetypal idea (that) can never fail; and in the world to come is destined to a special spiritual embodiment ".
All of these passages comes very close to the world of Phagavad-gita , as well as Veda , indeed. He has regarded man as something great, and valuable at the end of the world, but we shall not discuss the topic any longer now, but I shall return generally to the theme later in the current study when dealing e.g. psychognosy. But for now, some words of dualism.
W. Percy (NOTES 13) has considered the difference between mental and physical and emphasized there especially the role of Descartes (3) and his categorization of the world to be consisting the different departments, on the one hand of res extensa , and on the other hand of its [opposite] counterpart res cogitans , and his proposition that only the God know what one had to do with another. Percy has referred especially to English nominalism (4) which has split off the words and ideas from things. He continued, that there is difference of similar kind between European materialism and idealism.
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1. ( E. Stanton , Dreams of the Dead ., 1898)
2. ( Freytag , Lost Manuscripts ., Leibzig, 1869)
3. ((1596-1650); RENE DESCARTES was the French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, and especially he was an author of Le Discours de la Méthode (1637), in which he e.g. expounded a quasi-mechanical conception of the universe, which he reduced to space, matter and motion, operating under mathematical laws. But there was his famous (L.) Cogito, ergo sum : I think, therefore I exist. Famous has also become his other doctrine, namely the doctrine of Cartesian scepticism, which he introduced in his Méthode , too. Well-known is his differentiation between res cogitans and res extensa .)
4. ( English nominalism : The philosophical doctrine of Scholastics, according with e.g. universal, or abstract concepts are mere names, without any corresponding reality. We shall return to the theme later in the current study, because there is an opposite theory of JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, whose Scholastic realism was well-known by C.S. Peirce.)
[8]
But more interesting at this context is what W. Percy (NOTES 14) uttered on natural events [according to C.S. Peirce]:
" there are not one but two kinds of natural events in the world ",
from which one is dyadic (1) and the other triadic (2). In addition to this there are also complexus of dyads, which can be associated to conditioned learning by animals. There is a gap in the world, if we accept only the former alternative of these natural events as valid, but this does not refer to that they are independent from each others, or that we were able to split the world in two denying the latter.
C.S. Peirce (NOTES 15) has described feeling, knowing and willing as the three integral states of mind - according to Kant (3) and Tetens . We are not discussing the topic in detail now - but only referring by it to the integrity of mind, which a view C.S. Peirce advocated for, as well as the integrity of the whole world. The principle of synechism gives support to the interpretation that we cannot produce any remarkable views on reality without other people - which refers to sociability [of the concepts]. We should suspect strongly the possibility that there existed that kind of individuality that were rather independent from other individualities, that is, that there were single truths, which were independent from others, and something in themselves. In addition to this, we ought to expect that the difference between mental and material is not at all real one. We don't know the whole world, whatever it is, and we are participants of the world, which makes us one of its untouchable witnesses. If there were something absolutely out there, from where it could be possible to evaluate the world, we have nothing to do with it, anyhow. And if there is God, who knows all, He certainly has not told us what He knows, or made us as representatives of that truth of His own. But why He is so evil? Namely, if we were such truth at hand, we should not make so much mistakes that we have done, because of Wisdom, and shared omnipotence, and we were free from Sin. But now we shall leave this theleogical topic,and instead try to study those social settings, to which C.S. Peirce participated.
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1. ( Dyad : The number two, or group of two, couple.)
2. ( Triad : Group or set of three. in music: Chord of three notes. in chemistry: Group of three chemical elements, having similar properties, as e.g. iron, nickel, and cobalt.)
3. ((1724-1804); IMMANUEL KANT was the German philosopher, and metaphysician, and the founder of the school of transcendental philosophy, of which one of the fundamental principles is that knowledge of the external world depends upon sense-impressions co-ordinated or synthesized by reason, employing such categories or laws of thought as quality, quantity, causation, etc. However, KANT had two stages in his philosophy, from the early metaphysics, and absolute interpretation of the ultimate reality: he proposed for, that we can have the knowledge from substances by reason. Later he became more critical, and insisted that substances are beyond man's horizon. He reacted against HUME'S scepticism, insisting that it is only Das Ding an sich , from which we cannot have definite knowledge. He also reacted against LOCKE'S empirism, according with we cannot have knowledge concerning substances, arguing for that the knowledge concerning universals is derived from the mind, and it is a priori , but the knowledge, which we have after experience is a posteriori . In 1860's there were Neokantian Philosophy, whose advocates were e.g. LIEBMANN, HELMHOLZ, CASSIRER, and RICKERT.)
[9]
C.S. Peirce could not develop his ideas from nothing, and quite alone. There must have been a concrete- kind of synechism of social settings - by which I refer especially to C.S. Peirce's correspondence with his close friend WILLIAM James (1), whose younger brother was HENRY James (2) - the famous mystic author. The brothers made together two journeys to Europe from their father's demand, and because of William's "mental difficulties", and health. From A.J. Ayer (NOTES 16) we know that nobody could challenge William James, what comes to vividness and large imagination, and the freshness of his sense of humor. But trying to get more audiences than many of his collages, he emphasized mainly vivid and psychologically effective features, and not critics, and he was was apt to maintain his own attitudes, and emphasized the philosophy which was a kind of view of life. From the correspondence between James and C.S. Peirce we get to know that - in addition to the change of information - they sent to each others manuscripts, articles, and books. From Collected Papers (NOTES 17) we know that James has read that C.S. Peirce's manuscript which is known by the name " Telepathy " and that he also made several marginal notes on it.
There were other themes, too, which can be associated to synechism. At the letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to William James on 13th March in 1897 (NOTES 18), he praised James' ideas of tychism , but considered it only a part, and corollar to the general principle of synechism , which he told to have been studying already for 15 years.
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1. ((1842-1910); WILLIAM JAMES was the American philosopher and psychologist, and one of the formulators of theory of pragmatism. According A.J. AYER (1968, 190), James has written an introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James , [HENRY James Sr.] who became his "intellectual father", and influenced to James so that he got deep religious attitude. According to the fourth ENCY (1967, 240-241), James was sent with his brother to Europe twice, and he became and advocate of Renouvier's personalism. We shall discuss these themes later in the current study. From I. SCHEFFLER (1974, 85-86) we know that the reason, why their [biological] father sent them to Europe, was its free philosophical climate (see also: R.B. PERRY (1935)). According to A.J. AYER (1968, 183), James was first as an instructor in physiology at Harvard, after his studies in Europe, and later, in 1880, he became professor. He was a close friend of C.S. Peirce almost the whole of his life (1968, 13-14)). Also this theme we discuss later in the current study. One of the [possible] consequences of JAMES' journeys to Europe was that he also informed C.S. Peirce for the institutes of European universities, which C.S. Peirce valued high in that respect - BUT as we know from J. BRENT, he himself had an opportunity to visit in Berlin in 1875.)
2. ((1843-1916); HENRY JAMES was an American novelist, and the younger brother of WILLIAM JAMES. He has been regarded also as realist novelist at the end of 19th c., with William Dean Howells, Edith Wharton, and Villa Cather. Finally HENRY JAMES settled in Europe from 1875, and he was naturalized as a British subject in 1915, but most of his books are psychological interpretation of American high-society. As the realist views there are also the novels of American farming, whose advocates are e.g. Hamlin Garland, and the Norwegian-American author, Ole Roelvaag.)
[10]
But what an earth does this theme of telepathy at this context - especially when we discuss pragmatism (1) which has been considered very empirical and also as very pragmata in its nature? We know that especially what concerns the questions on religion and metaphysics C.S. Peirce, as well as other pragmatists kicked very often over the traces. J.E. Smith (NOTES 19) has written that when C.S. Peirce studied the questions of the philosophy of science he also studied the existence of God, and he tried to use the theory of hypothetic reasoning in the questions of religion. But also James tried to synthesize different areas of human knowledge together, and seek tendencies between them - which are, according to C.S. Peirce, synechist, live and flexible. These themes have their currency, too, when just thinking all kinds of human networks - with or without such technical tools as computers.
Accepting that man has not got any essential features, or ideas in regard of the real world, and that he never will, is he believing or knowing something - concerning knowledge or other beliefs? What are the necessary consequences of that. It was already Duns Scotus (2) who argued for that there is no difference between science and religion. And further - according to C.S. Peirce, we can consider our present reality as something between the opposite poles of accidental chance and lawfulness (3). But if we have this kind of mixed reality - what makes it possible that we can still discuss the pure concepts of being false or true? If we have apprehended all of the ideas which are true, the question is: why those false things have been in front of us before, and what has been their role - should we just conclude that there has taken place some development, within which there must be present mistakes, and wrong interpretations? And what makes it possible that there are certain spheres and directions, or that such one come to existence - to where we can develop ourselves? We can conclude further that there must be a possibility that both false and true things can exist, and that ideas are able to interact with each other somehow, and that also those false ideas must have some characters which we can find in true ideas. I suppose that every ism can be proved to be true or false, because of that very feature - notwithstanding that there were no eternal and infinite ideas available, yet. But it does not suggest to any validation, but instead the use of temporal rules, which seem to be applicable enough, and that there is no need for ideas, which need to be developed ad ininitum .
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1. (( Pragmatism : (according a narrow pragmatic maxim): a belief or a theory that the truth or value of a concept or assertion depends upon its practical bearing upon human interests. C.f. the narrow term Pragmatic: concerned with practical results and values, and treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.)
2. ((1266-1308)JOHN DUNS SCOTUS ( John Duns) was a Scholastic theologian, and -according to tradition - born at Duns, Berwickshire. He was called the 'subtle doctor', and his works on theology, logic, and philosophy were university textbooks until the 16th c. He was a Franciscan monk, who worked as a teacher in Oxford University, and attacked especially against AQUINAS -emphasizing especially the difference between knowledge and faith. However, Scotus has been considered the one of those Scholastic philosophers, and an advocate of Scholastic realism, which C.S. Peirce appreciated high.
3. (These are the two opposite poles in C.S. Peirce's cosmology, where the former illustrated the state of beginning, and the latter the state of the end. This can be applied to single concepts, and to their development, too, from interpreted to sign ad infinitum .[that is= to its ultimate end].)
[11]
If we now think to choose isms as the model of orientation, we ought to remember the very reason, why they have been constructed. First of all, they are in explanation, and categorization when comparing schools of philosophy; they are not entities (1) to be found. When discussing, instead, synechism, we have (at least) a faint possibility to get used work-principles, according which the world might be made of - or we can have a strategy which to apply to describe what has taken place especially in human knowledge. I shall prefer of these alternatives synechism, but I shall use the categories of isms , too, as the useful tools, for the purposes of current study.
I want especially to emphasize the role of future in knowing, also when discussing the present study, and its Wisdom. If future is a powerful agent in knowing, it shall reveal its faces during the current study, or at least, during the whole development of human knowledge. But what are we studying, then? This study, or something more general? Let us now think that pragmatism [if it is a school of philosophy at all] is such a collection of ideas, which have been derived from different philosophical schools. We have already discussed that the question of schools as isms, may be quite illusory. Instead, there might have been several philosophers, and everyone of them is something more than the rest of the mass. Such a brilliant philosopher is not remarkable as a schoolmaster, but instead interesting person, who has written his best ideas to facilitate work of future generations, and they have also succeeded to be something more that a stereotypic image of a philosopher. Pragmatists have repeatedly emphasized that man must reach the heart of philosophy, or science, and that some philosophiers have succeeded to do this, as also add something into the kernel of human knowledge.
C.S. Peirce has emphasized the view that the most important in knowing is distant future, if we discuss what our concepts and inventions might really mean, say e.g. synechism, or have they any importance in a course of time, notwithstanding that some of them might have their rightness right now, and they have it for the current purpose we have in our currency. That is, we cannot measure the absolute validity of the concepts, but only use them. This, in turn, means [If we think the current study] that any new idea, which we shall have during the study, and which concerns the results we might have, is [in fact] carrying on beyond the horizon of the study, and this kind of a new idea is, in a way, nonsense, before we shall have the results, which are revealing its truths. Hence, there are several ifs before any further explanation, and the most decisive of them is, that whether the mind [to come] becomes capable to handle with the new surroundings [to come], or not.
As a consequence, we cannot overrun any ism, before we have a point of view, from which it it easy to see them a fictions, and not via news isms, but from a state without them all. But we have not this scenery or view, yet. And we have not yet presented any new idea, either. But if we are trying to deny isms, for example, it is clear that if we have any ism in the world to come still left, we have not reached the world, to which the development has been aimed to - if we are instisting that the end of the world cannot include such things any more. But we can have a kind of future as simulation, or something in posse (2), that is, in imagination. And if it seems to be that we have the end of the world already now, which we have just expected to come in future, and which we have predicted in detail, we have, in fact, lost the whole game before it has began. We can destroy ourselves as a specie, and claim that just it was the goal of all our enterprises, but this is not true.
Future is not a matter of our present, or our agony, or human specie, and we have no inevitably valid tool - by which we can necessary to prove things to be true. We are not the most important feature of the universal development, and without us there shall be the great goal - the question is: are we willing to participate to it, or not, and not of our great influence. To avoid those traps of megalomany when discussing the development of the whole universe, or its blind, and still endless loops (which are not like ends), we must have in our use the principle of synechism, as well as many other tools. And we must also comprehend in the new way those things - eternal and infinite - as kinds of possible futures, because the world we have NOW is not migrated into such kind of state of things yet, but our present can be illustrated as a kind of end. This special end does not stand in saecula saeculorum (3) but instead it has its greatest effectiveness during this very moment, and then it shall fall asleep - until it shall be awaken at the future reality - if it had any genuine meaning - as the new start, perhaps.
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1. ( Entity : A things existence, something with real and separate existence, as distinction from its qualities or relations.)
2. ((L.) In posse : In potential existence; possible.)
3. ((L.) In saeucula saeculorum : For ever and ever.)
[12]
1. ( Fell, J.P ., Heigegger and Sartre, An Essay of Being and Place ., New Work, p. 367, 1979)
2. ( Heidegger, M ., Nietzsche ., I, Verlag Günther Neske., Pfullingen., p. 548, 1961)
3. ( Peirce, C.S ., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce ., VII., edited by Arthur W. Burks., Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., Synechism and Immortality, .573, 1966)
4. ( Wittgenstein, L ., Über Gewissheit - On Certainty ., edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Engl. trans. by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe., Oxford., Basil Blackwell., §§ 449, 559, 1969 - Cf. Wittgenstein, L . Philosophische Untersuchungen - Philosophical Investigations ., Engl. trans. by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe., Basil Blackwell, Oxford., p. 226, 1953)
5. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .565, 1966)
6. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .566, 1966)
7. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .570, 1966)
8. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .571, 1966)
9. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .572, 1966)
10 ( Bhagavad-gita, As it Is ., New York., 10.12-13, 1972)
11. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .572, 1966)
12. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., Synechism and ..., .574-.576, 1966)
13. ( Percy, W ., "The Divided Creature"., reprinted from WILSON QUARTERLY., Copyright 1989, by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars., Summer 1989., AA 9/89-37., pp. 78, 80.)
14 ( Percy, W ., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 81, 1989)
15 ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., § 2. Forms of Consciousness., .540, 1966)
[13]
16 ( Ayer, A.J ., The Origins of Pragmatism ., London - Melbourne - Toronto., p. 185, 1968)
17 ( Collected Papers of ... ., VII., p. 359f, 1966)
18. ( Collected Papers of ... ., VIII., Lett., 13.3. 1897; C.S. Peirce to William James pp. 187-188, 1966)
19 ( Smith, J.E ., The Spirit of American Philosophy ., New York, pp. 3-37, 1966)
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[14]
Most critics, as well as historians of the American philosophy have generally regarded transcendentalism (1) as very essential philosophical movement in America during the 19th century. From the first ENCY (NOTES 1) we know that at the beginning the center of that movement was Boston, and its influence was the most effective just before American Civil War (2). American transcendentalists were interested in philosophies of Kant , and Hegel (3) - as well as in the philosophies of von Schelling (4), and Victor Cousin. In addition to this, those American philosophers were acquainted with Platonian thoughts. But it was Emerson (5) who presented most clearly the characteristic traits of American transcendental metaphysics in his Nature which was published in 1836.
An interesting question is that have these idealistic traits of philosophy anything common with pragmatists? Let us study the topic next. If we think C.S. Peirce's cosmology - there is a certain similarity with certain ideas of Schelling - for example how C.S. Peirce (NOTES 2) has put human mind, as a plastic unit, to the important role in the development of the universe. Also when he assumed that in the human mind evolution and generalizing tendency is still at work - there are echoes of Schelling - but also echoes from evolution philosophy.
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1. ( Transcendentalism : Transcendental philosophy: especially idealism of SCHELLING, FICHTE, and HEGEL which does not recognize KANT'S distinction between transcendent and transcendental. Also: the religio-philosophical doctrine of EMERSON and his followers. Other, more diffuse meanings of the term are e.g.: extravagant, vague, or visionary quality, philosophy, language, etc.)
2. ( American Civil War (1861-1865); War between Southern (Confederate) and northern States before their Union.)
3. ((1770-1831); GEORG WILHELM FRIENDRICH HEGEL was the German philosopher, in whose system known by the name of Absolute Idealism pure being is regarded as pure thought, and the universe, as well as its development, and philosophy - as its dialectical explication.)
4. ((1775-1854); FRIENDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH von SCHELLING was the German philosopher, who regarded nature as single living organism working towards self-consciousness, a faculty dormant in inanimate objects and fully awake only in man, whose being consists in 'intellectual intuition' of the world he creates.)
5. ((1803-1882); RALPH WALDO EMERSON was an American philosophic writer and essayist.)
[15]
In C.S. Peirce 's (NOTES 3) synechism, which we have already discussed at previous chapter, there was e.g. the sentence, which says:
" a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole ,
which expressed also a similar point of view that Schelling has advocated for. Unfortunately, I cannot prove that C.S. Peirce has derived his thoughts just from him, but it is obvious that he got the idea from ancient Creek philosophers, from those who emphasized living features of the world. Obviously there were this kind of thoughts in that philosohical climate, where C.S. Peirce spent his life - and it is the very fact that many of his ideas which he introduced were not new ones. There was an objective, or absolute idealism, whose great advocator was Hegel, to whose name the term dialectic (1) has been generally associated to. He regarded the whole and objective reality as the reflection of Geist, and maintained that man is able to comprehend it, too. But what is important in this idea is that there cannot be the larger objective reality behind that totality, which we are able to apprehend, and with which we can interact actively. This is true notwithstanding that we cannot reach all of its ultimate ends right now. At some day, perhaps, we shall become acquainted with those distant things - that is - there is nothing preventing us to apprehend the whole world as it is.
Just in that sense - there is nothing hidden, or secret, or something unknown forever, and which only Geist knows. In general: it is no wonder that in the American philosophical tradition there are all kinds personalism - also idealistic ones, because man has this access into the secrets of the world, and that man can do it consciously. We can become acquaintance with these schools of personalism from the sixth ENCY (NOTES 4). From the fourth ENCY (NOTES 5) we know that G.H. Howinson has been known such as an advocate of personalism who didn't interpret individuals dependent from infinite person, or creation, as e.g. B.P. Bowne - or Rational Theists , and their famous predecessor Aquinas (2). Howinson emphasized the freedom of individuals which would be fulfilled if there were such a creator who has ruled all the things beforehand [as well good as bad alternatives]. What is that idealistic tradition - as a whole? M.L. Bigge (NOTES 6) has described idealism, that it considers the world as the universal consciousness, whose variants are substantial consciousness. It seems to me that there are something very Hegelian currents in Bigge's illustration, but it says nothing about that how large the whole universal consciousness really is, or is it becoming something more, or is it possible that it can loose its control - as a consequence of "command and control problems" - or what kind are the real and ultimate things in themselves in the universe.
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1. ( Dialectic : Critical dealing with metaphysical contradictions and their solutions, especially in HEGEL'S philosophy, the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis representing the process of thought developing towards completion.)
2. ((c 1225-1274); St. THOMAS AQUINASs was the Italian philosopher, a Dominican friar, whose many writings, and works, notably his Summa Totius Theologiae represent the culmination of Scholastic philosophy.)
[16]
There is also a school of subjective idealism which considers the nature as the reflection of finite spiritual being who have no objective reality behind it, or within it, that it has in itself, and there is nothing behind the wholeness we know e.g. at the moment. Berkeley (1) and Kant [in his critical stage] have been regarded as advocators of such idealism. Also German idealist Fichte (2) have been regarded as subjective idealist, and as a founder of German idealism. If we think e.g. Berkeley's statement esse est percipi applied in a concrete situation - e.g. that we have a knowledge concerning a thing because somebody has had a experience of its existence, and that somebody has perceived it to happen - we do not have much idealism in our view. But if we think the whole principle, that nothing can exits without being perceived, we can find out, that the whole universe exist because of that kind of observation.
It is quite possible that I just don't have that kind of experience because I am not a creature to be intended to have this experience of it, and I don't know anybody who has it. But if the existence of a thing (or any thing) cannot be possible at all, without somebody is perceiving it, say, God, for example, we have concerning with an idealistic interpretation of the true essence of the world, because a perceiver in question is not a material thing, but relatively complicated cluster of non-material elements. But we might suppose, too, that if there are no mental acts, there is nothing.
Thinking the world in initio (3), and any kind of existence in general, there might be nothing without a perception before. In the situation like this - there is nothing to to perceive, either, because there have been no actions, and the only actions, which we ought to count, should be perceptions [of nothing]. There might be no development at all, without other, more sophisticated perceptions made by somebody [e.g. by God], or without accidental series of happenings, which were unconscious. There is a question of that if God had any complicated structure in His mind before the very first perception, or not?
It is strange that Berkeley argued for that there are no abstract ideas, or matter in themselves. This sounds clear, if we think the idea, that perception comes before any thing perceived, and that ideas are reflections arose from this kind of context. There is no doubt that before these contexts there must have been long series of self-communication of God, or First Cause , and that there were any mutual interaction before this kind of existence. Because the whole universe exists after the self-perception continuously made by God, we might discuss of our own ignorance mainly by the terms of incompleteness, or something to come, and not yet reached.
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1. ((1685-1753); GEORGE BERKELEY was an Irish bishop and idealist philosopher. Well-known is his statement esse est percipi , which is an expression of that idealism, too. His critics against the law of cause and effect was the preliminary of later critics made by HUME.)
2. ((1762-1814); FICHTE was the German idealist philosopher,and an advocate of KANT'S philosophy, and inspired by it, he wrote Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792), which was regarded as written by KANT. He was also famous for his Reden an die deutsche Nation (1807-1808), which he wrote during the French occupation of Prussia.)
3. (L.) In initio : In the beginning. When discussing the very beginning ot the universe, we can suppose that there was nothing before - or we can suppose that there was nothing material, but something which was able to expose it into existence - or we may suppose that there was something, but not in a form that we can understand, or not the kind which was able to create the world as conscious being, but being still a kind of a reality.)
[17]
But what about those American transcendentalists who actually influenced to the pragmatist movement, or who have been in contact with it?
Let's take two of the cases in consideration. From the first ENCY (NOTES 7) we know that one of those was Paul Carus. At a letter, which C.S. Peirce has mailed to him and which has been written in 1910 (NOTES 8) we can read e.g. some C.S. Peirce's thoughts concerning the logic of science. Unfortunately part of the letter have been lost. From the first ENCY (NOTES 9) we know that also HENRY James Sr. has been regarded one of the American transcendentalists, and that he has been in close contact with pragmatists, too. His literal remains has been considered to be full of mystics but he had an important role in the philosophical development of William James. And A.J. Ayer (NOTES 10) has told us that James wrote an introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James . But why we should consider HENRY James Sr an important person?
Just because we can regarded him as WILLIAM James' "spiritual father", who influenced strongly to his moral and intellectual orientation, as well as to the development of his religious attitudes. Here and there in the correspondence between C.S. Peirce and James we can trace a lot of religious themes, and we know, too, that C.S. Peirce was apt to join religious themes to his philosophical discussions. And we cannot forget JOSIAH Royce, with whom C.S. Peirce was in correspondence. But what kind were C.S. Peirce's attitudes towards Royce's philosophy , in fact? At the letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to W. James on the 12th June in 1902 (NOTES 11) he told that he has being studied Royce's The World and Individual, and that he regarded its ideas as beautiful ones but that its logic seemed to him most execrable (1). These opinions suggest to that, notwithstanding that C.S. Peirce didn't accept Royce's logic, he had some contacts with American idealistic tradition by him. From the fourth ENCY (NOTES 12) we get to know, in turn, that Royce was a member of W. James ' intellectual society. We know that James (NOTES 13) appreciated a lot the idea of the instant and infinite nature of God's consciousness by J. Royce 's (NOTES 14), which can be found at The Conception of God . When considering Royce, we must take in advance Dewey (2), too.
It was just Dewey (NOTES 15) who has derived some of his thoughts from Royce - as he has written himself at his article which concerned G.H. Mead. We shall return to this article later during the current study. But via Royce we cannot find a genuine, and reliable link from pragmatism to idealism, because we cannot prove who is derived something from another, and when this has been taken place.
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1. (C.f. C.S. Peirce's opinion to HEGEL'S logic later during the current chapter.)
2. ((1859-1952)); JOHN DEWEY was an American philosopher, pragmatist, and an influential figure specially in the field of education. In his philosophical development there were different stages, namely [Scottish] intuitionism, absolute [Hegelian] idealism, and instrumentalism (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 77). It was due of G.S. MORRIS, that he became an advocate of Hegelian idealism (acc. BORING 1931, 506-507, 539-542). His interest to experimental psychology influenced to that he rejected that Hegelian idealism (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 81). His experiences at the field of pedagogic influenced to that he adopted instrumentalism ( acc. BERNSTEIN 1976, 83-84). When he became the professor at Chicago in 1894, he founded the work [laboratory] school in 1896, and he was a principal of the school until 1904. However, his concepts concerning education didn't change much after 1897 (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 87). Later his method influenced to Austrian school reform - to which LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN participated first as student, and later as a teacher in (two) Austrian village schools.)
[18]
There were live social relationships between pragmatists and American Idealists, among these some Royce's ideas which pragmatists appreciated - but this was not a systematic flow of the mutual influences, and acceptances, however. We have only that warm and positive influence which we can prove between WILLIAM James and HENRY James Sr. - in this case. Now I want to discuss idealism in the sense of Plato, and his concept of idea (1). But there is also the general definition of the term idea (2). The adjective ideal (3) which can be related to the sphere of the world which is consisting of Platonic ideas, too, but there are also the meanings of ordinary life within it. But is it the case, as Plato says, that object of external perception can be held to consisting of ideas? Or is the rock-bottom of the whole world something according to Democritus (4)? Notwithstanding that we shall discuss the atomistic philosophy of Democritus later in the current study just few words about it.
He just reasoned that the world might be made of materia, and void. When thinking its ancient advocators, and their knowledge, it is obviously not the same as atom theory (5). The essence of Democritean materialism, or atomistic philosophy, is that there are two kinds of reality in the universe, namely chaos (6) and cosmos (7), and that the latter will exist only temporarily, and only for an age. Hence, a cosmos is not as eternal, as the former, with its smallest particles, atoms, which are eternal, and infinite in number. But the fact is that there can exist also rational cosmos, but its duration does not match to the age of cosmos, and it is finite, and therefore, there cannot exist infinite ideas in the materialistic universe.
C.W. Morris (NOTES 16) has called C.S. Peirce as Platonian realist for the reason that C.S. Peirce advocated the view that the whole nature is controlled by laws which are above all existence. Those laws are that power which make it possible that there can be a space, where, in turn, the results of those laws can exist- as well as organic existence and life, and both matter and causation. Those laws are eternal forms, and like mind, thought, or ideas, but not like any of the rules which we can discover in actual and sequential causation, and finite existence. As the consequence of this, the final mind has nothing to do with our operating with our incomplete signs, in spite of that we can regard any sign as means, by which something is brought into the mind, meanwhile the object, to which sign has referred to, has been left outside the mind. Hence, all phenomena have been only presented to mind with them.
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1. ( Idea [in Platonic philosophy]: Externally existing pattern of which individual things in any class are imperfect copies. See also idea in philosophies of Descartes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel at footnotes of next page.)
2. ( Idea : [General definition]: Archetype, pattern, as distinction from its realization in individuals; also conception of standard or principle to be recognized or aimed at; plan of action; notion conceived by the mind; way of thinking; vague belief, fancy)
3. ( Ideal : Relating to consisting of Platonic ideas. There are also such meanings as: 1.) Answering to one's highest conception; perfect or supremely excellent in its kind. 2.) Embodying an idea; existing only in idea, visionary.)
4. ((c. 460-c 370 B.C.); DEMOCRITUS has advanced the theory that the world was formed by the concourse of atoms. He held that the universe consists of material bodies and void.)
5. ( Atom theory [Physics]: Theory that elements consist of atoms of definite weight, and that atoms of different elements unite with one another in fixed proportions.)
6. ( Chaos : Formless void, great deep of primordial matter, abyss from which cosmos was evolved.)
7. ( Cosmos : The universe as an ordered whole.)
[19]
C.W. Morris (NOTES 17) has argued for that C.S. Peirce regarded symbolic process also as something more than the means, by which man will achieve the larger contexts of understandings. But there is also that conception of sign that they can develop further, according to the laws of interference, which is obviously linked to the [field of] association. C.W. Morris (NOTES 18) has written, too, that C.S. Peirce emphasized the symbolic nature of man, and his external nature, too. Every thought can be regarded as external sign, and, therefore, man can be regarded as external sign, too. But is man an agent who is bringing something in, and in the same time leaving something outside - as an external sign? The answer is yes, if we are thinking human understanding in general.
From C.W. Morris (NOTES 19) we also know C.S. Peirce regarded human mind as symbolic, unlimited, and as a sign by interference, and that concept - as well as the concepts of thought and idea, act like eternal laws which are something above space - where in turn all the results and existence can be found. Man is something above space and time, and can be understood by his special nature of being something synthesized, and not something to be found in certain space and time. According to Morris, all of this is [just] like Platonian idealism. But if we think e.g. the term idea there, we can say that in C.S. Peirce's conception of the term is similar to the concept which was introduced by Descartes and Locke (1) - but there is something from Kant (2), and something from Hegel (3), too.
I addition to this, C.S. Peirce has also derived his ideas concerning the role of man in the development of the universe - not from Plato (if we are speaking about the idea in question derived from idealism) - but instead from Berkeley, and, perhaps, from Schelling, and from Royce, too. And as we shall see, there are certain influences from Spinoza (4), too.
Of course, it was not only a single term, say, idea, which C.S. Peirce adopted from idealism, but instead the general belief to that there are some eternal features, or self-regulating, and sophisticated ways of being, which are not apart of the world, and by which we can explain the world, as well as answer the question how all once began, and what kind might be the end, after all. The very important point in there is that we really need those constructions when explaining something more complicated.
And if we discuss development, any kind, there must be something out of reach, but still something more complete - by which to explain becoming. But why? Because there must be a kind of space, or possibility, to which any development can be based, and within with it can be forced to be run, and from where there is also a kind of gravity, or cues to follow. I think that these kind of ideas he just derived from idealism, when emphasizing the role of generalizing tendency [of ideas] when describing e.g. forms of consciousness. The similar echoes we have in his general- and nomological psychognosy, which we discuss later in the current study in detail.
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1. ( Idea : In the philosophies of Descartes and Locke: immediate object of thought or mental perception.)
2. ( Idea : In the philosophy of Kant: conception of reason transcending all experience.)
3. ( Idea : In the philosophy of Hegel: absolute truth of which all phenomenal existence is expression.)
4. ((1632-1677); BENEDICT(US) (Baurd) de SPINOZA was a Dutch Jew of Portugese origin, philosopher; author of Ethics, in which he rejected the CARTESIAN dualism of spirit and matter and saw only 'one infinite substance, of which infinite existence are modes or limitations '; God was (for Spinoza) the immanent cause of the universe, not a ruler outside it, and his system is, in a sense, pantheistic; he also denied personal immortality and the transcendent distinction between dood and evil. He was an author of Tractatus Theologico - Politicus (1670), De intellectus emendatione , and Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata , Postume publ. (1677))
[20]
Let us discuss now in detail some Spinoza's ideas - because C.S. Peirce appreciated him a lot - as we know from his letter to Mario Calderoni which has been mailed c. 1905 (NOTES 20). But what kind was that idealism Spinoza advocated for? In general, he was an advocator of rationalism (1), as well as an enthusiast advocate of pantheistic philosophy (2). Both of these elements are essential features in his philosophy:
First , he has emphasized the unity of the world, and according to him we cannot reach the dimensions of infinite as persons, but before it we must join to the wholeness of the world. There is the same tendency as in C.S. Peirce 's (NOTES 21) doctrine of synechism, namely, to regard the world as an unity, too.
Second , Spinoza has thought that there are several kompetiting things as the pleasure and egoistic strives, which were not in agree between strives for higher perfection - which is the final goal of all souls. This, in turn, is connected to the mutual relationship of love and reason, in general. From H. Sidgwick (NOTES 22) we know that Spinoza's idea that the individual mind strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being but that the object of this impulse cannot be separated from pleasure or joy; because they are a passion, in which the soul passes to higher perfection. The pleasure is not the goal of that impulse intended to be hit primarily - but is a counterpart at the mind's perfection, or at self-realization or self-development. All of these ideas are familiar to pragmatists, and they can be found also by C.S. Peirce - but there are differences between pragmatists and Spinoza, too, especially what concerns the concept of substance (3). Spinoza has urged in his Ethica ordine for that the basic concept of the substance implies to the creature which has an self-existence, and which will be understood by that self-existence. This kind of [fundamental] substance Spinoza called God, who has infinite number of characters. We do not know all of His characters but only two of them, namely the thought and the dimension - which are eternal and infinite in their nature, because they are the characters of God. W. James didn't advocate this kind of spiritualistic view (4), but instead argued for that it is possible to grasp almost everything at last.
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1. ( Rationalism : Practice of explaining the supernatural in religion in a way consonant with reason, or treating reason as the ultimate authority in religion as elsewhere; theory that reason is foundation of certainty in knowledge.)
2. ( Pantheism : Doctrine that God is everything and that everything is God.)
3. ( Substance : What underlies phenomena, permanent substratum of things, that in which accidents or attributes inhere; also essential nature, and essence of most important parts of anything, and purport and real meaning - Descartes emphasized the independence of substance, as a contrary to its varying attributes, and referred to God, who doesn't need anything else to maintain His existence; Spinoza referred, by the concept, to the whole universe, but for Hume substance was an imagined thing. We shall discuss this Hume's idea later.)
4. ( Spiritualistic substance psychology : James rejected this kind of view when applying it to psychology (see: JAMES 1952, 211). He referred with the concept substantial mainly to the kind of the self-existing being, or one which doesn't need other subject in which to inhere (FORD) 1982, 13). Hence, we cannot become acquaintance with this kind of reality. As we know e.g. from Pragmatism , and from other literal sources, he didn't accept the concept substance - as an explanation for our human life, and that he considered this kind of substantial-like God not at all human-like God, who we should not obey, or who we could not at all trust, or with whom we could be in any kind of mutual relationship.)
[21]
I think that there is a similarity between Spinoza and C.S. Peirce concerning the diminishing role of the single personality in the mind's perfection. In C.S. Peirce's epistemology (1) there are as kompetiting components on the one hand love, and on the other hand reason, and the strive within them to be cooperatively synthesized into the one and only wholeness. From I. Scheffler (NOTES 23) we get to know that C.S. Peirce's very essential idea that there are the laws of love and reason , which shall join together in a very distant future. But by this kind a view C.S. Peirce can be associated to Plato, too, who suggested to that counterpart of the human spirit is Eros , when we are striving for goodness and beauty. And if we are discussing beauty, we must take account also an art of aesthetics (2). We can find the term aesthetic almost in every turn, when studying pragmatism. This sounds to me like praising human-like knowledge, and that this kind of knowledge we MUST develop further, if we want to be accurate in our humanity.
There is a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to W. James and which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 24) where he has illustrated his new view on logic saying that logic is anchored to ethics (4), and this, in turn, is anchored to esthetics. But what does this mean, actually? I think that there is just that emphasis the role of ethic and aesthetic nature of the whole knowledge, and that without that very nature we are not able to reach higher levels of knowledge at all, or reach our human nature.
Third , Spinoza has argued for that individual soul is limited, but it can be expanded. There are some lower levels in man's pursuit to the completeness of his understanding. In that lower level the principle that the rational action follows is necessarily egoistic, and there is nothing but the impulse of self-preservation. From H. Sidgwick (NOTES 25) we get to know that:
" The individual mind, like everything else, strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being, and that effort is its very essence ... But the highest form of the self-realization or self-development consists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessity order as modifications of the one divine being, and willing acceptance of all which springs from this comprehension ... This is the notion of self-realization as defined not only but for a philosopher ".
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1. ( Epistemology : Theory of method or grounds of knowledge.)
2. ( Aesthetics : Philosophy of the beautiful; philosophy of art.)
3. (W. James has explained in his Pragmatism, that there is an aesthetic unity with things, which is very much like teleological unity (1913, p. 96).)
4. ( Ethics : Science of morals; study of the principles of human duty, or treatise of this; moral principles; rules of conduct.)
[22]
One consequence of this is that we cannot speak about our very own special personality any more as infinite, but instead finite. In its individual form also [our] soul is a kind of mode or limitation, because it can partly regarded as material one, but there is no strict boundaries to prevent it to enlarge itself to that spiritual dimension of it. Hence, we can state that any soul contains something of thought and something of dimension, as well as it has that infinite, and finite essence. But why our soul must contain both finite and infinite characters? Because one part of us must exist in finite collections or series of events, meanwhile that another part of us comes to existence to that spiritual dimension. We cannot live forever as persons, how sophisticated and wise they ever can be, and we have no firm future before us as modes or limitations. Is there the fact that we cannot reach as persons the true essence of God at all, and it is quite possible that we cannot have any eternal life in heaven? As persons, modes or limitations we cannot have any infinite existence. But there is a limitation within God Himself, too. The substance of God must maintain His certain characters in finite existence, notwithstanding that they are not such ones. Otherwise he could not exist at all in [our] souls. But we have still some hope. Namely,
Fourth , Spinoza has proposed for the possibility of the highest realization of the self-development. From H. Sidgwick (NOTES 26) we know that:
" In this state the mind is purely active, without any admixture of passion or passivity; and thus its essential nature is realized or actualized to the greatest possible degree. We can see that man is forced to renounce the world which is accepted in the egoistic state and man must become an inseparable part of the totality ".
This is just according C.S. Peirce's ideas, which he has presented in his cosmology. But for now few words concerning C.S. Peirce's ideas concerning the essence of mind. According him both will and activity belong - as components - to the three classes of mind: C.S. Peirce (NOTES 27), and some psychologists at his age, have described the mind consisting of feeling, cognition and voliotion (will).
As predecessors of the conception C.S. Peirce has referred especially to Kant, and also to his philosophical grandfather Tetens, as well as to the ancient writers upon rhetoric (1). According to C.S. Peirce :
" those ancient writers instructed the orator to begin his discourse by creating a proper state of feeling in the minds of auditors, to follow this with whatever he was going to address to their understandings, that is, to produce cognitions, and finally, inflame them to action of will ... For rhetoricians, therefore, the triad named the three states of mind. But no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between different integral states of mind, and certainly not between such states as feeling, knowing and willing ".
There we have, again, those ancient philosopher, from whom somebody has "taken" something important. And there we have, again, the principle of synechism at hand - which comes very close to Spinoza's sentence:
" actualization to the greatest possible degree "
- where all things are bound together, and there is nothing apart of the totality. But what is especially important in there? There is the fact that we have used even our words to divide, and separate things from each others, and we have become blind what concerns their synechistic nature.
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1. ( Rhetoric : Treatise on the art of persuasive or impressive speaking or writing, also language designed to persuade or impress.)
[23]
It seems to me that Spinoza has emphasized the process, by which we can reach the (final) goal, and unity - and that there is something which makes the whole process possible. There are quite similar tendencies also in the philosophy of C.S. Peirce (NOTES 28) who has regarded those features essential in his grand cosmogony (1), which is the philosophy to come.
Quite another point of view has had Schopenhauer (1), as well as other voluntary philosophers, which, as a term, refers to those who have emphasized in their philosophies one's own free will, or acting, and intentionality. But there must be remembered that most voluntarists have put will into the main role - even in the most general human enterprises, where it is difficult to say what we are actually willing, or waiting for. Anyway, there must be present something more than some blind tendency, or willing of organisms. This is, again, the deep question concerning human knowledge, and of its more general features.
C.S. Peirce (NOTES 29) has described e.g. an occult (3) nature of icon (4) and diagram, which are something being at higher level, and being beyond the horizon of instant perception, and, in their way, independent, but in the same time, being as true levels of experience, which still remain unknown and hidden, because those higher levels are not fully apprehended. Now, what is important, is that there are such levels, if we understood them completely, or not. They have become to us, when we have brought something to them. That is - are we willing as hard as it is possible to will - it does us help to achieve those hidden, but true levels. We must have some other properties which to use as tools, too.
According to his Platonian realism, C.S. Peirce (NOTES 30) argued for that there is a larger cosmic process where both mentality and mind are nothing but cases within it, and that there are eternal forms and laws which make possible that which is potential can become actual, and revealed. Then there are the final laws and causalities which - in every time and age - will favor certain kind of existence and deny others. Our mentality has its true existence in the world of the final causality, and not in the finite existence and strivings, where they occasionally seem to appear and disappear, and change their appearance, and where they are sometimes experiences as immediate feelings. All of their existence shall obey The Laws of Final Causality. The mentality and mind, as well as all cases in the phenomenon which can be called life, can be seen to be only as the cases in the larger (cosmic) processes. For the reason, both thought and mind belong to the internal characters of the universe, which cannot be apprehended because they are something to come, or to be revealed. We are waiting something to come behind curtains of infinity.
I think that all of these references suggest to Spinoza's idea of man being inseparable part of the totality, too. But we must remind that C.S. Peirce did not mention or refer to Spinoza at these questions, however.
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1. ( Cosmogony : (Theory of) the creation of the universe. In astrophysics the term suggests to a branch of physics studying the origins and structure of the universe. With his Grand Cosmogony C.S. Peirce referred to the continuous creation, or becoming to something more complex than now (to something being created), and not to something which is already done)
2. ((1788-1860); ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER was the German philosopher, who has been described a pessimistic philosopher, and an author of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung ., 1-2 (1818), and Über den Natur (1836). He considered himself as a follower of Kant, but he interpreted Kant's critical idealism into psychological idealism. He has taught, too, that the absolute reality is blind and restless will, that all existence is essentially evil, and that release can be attained only by overcoming the will to live. Among his followers are Nietzsche, WAGNER, and E. von HARTMANN.)
3. ( Occult : Kept secret, esoteric; recondite, mysterious, beyond the range of ordinary knowledge; involving the upernatural, mystical.)
4. (Cf. Iconology : The study of icons, but also symbolical representation, symbolism. There is also the term Eikon , which has been used by theologicans of Orthodox Church.)
[24]
Fifth , as we remind - according to Spinoza - we do not know all of the characters of God but only two of them, namely the thought and dimension - which are eternal and infinite. By these characters man is able to join to God. C.S. Peirce has tried to connect to each other both thought and dimension - especially when studying abstraction , and the essence of signs, but he has also been interested in processes and feelings, and the whole phenomenon, where we perceive something at its instant way of being. Of course there might be other influences, too. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 31) has described the abstraction as a certain kind of an expansive process, or centrifugal tendency of thought. There might be an interesting link to Descartes' vorticism (1), by which he tried to explain the development of the universe. It may be applicable in astronomy, and e.g. when explained the movements of galaxies which have black holes in their center, and alike, but PERHAPS applicable when discussing human abstraction, too.
This general principle of vorticism explains only associations, when applied into C.S. Peirce's model of the three integral states of mind, and especially into abstraction. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 32) has also suggested for that there are many of processes, which function to their own directions, and they are all present when we deal with our ideas. One of these directions is association; that ideas must consist of large associations, before they will be crystallized into the sets which remain such ones.
C.S. Peirce (NOTES 33) has also proposed to that associations [or sets of ideas], which stay for a long time as they are , are mainly something like inherited, or spontaneously grown, but there are also accidental born sets of ideas. The rest of associations depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set so that they also remain that set. These integrated structures have no central axis, or gravitation, or principle, which is maintaining any of sets, and therefore there is no room for vorticism. At least, they have not such integrated gravitation-like behavior at the moment. It seems to me that there are not influences in C.S. Peirce's philosophy from Descartes' vorticism, notwithstanding that both philosophers have emphasized that likelihood to natural forces when discussing thought, or such things.
There is not, yet, any stable mind created by us present, as such. If there is one, it is certainly not created by us intentionally, but it may be a result of heterogenous collection of processes, but which does not contain any cues to them any more. But of course there might be something internal, or "has been" or "shall be". But were the reason for the birth whatever it was, or the current status heavy or weak - it is true that when we are trying to explain how thought and dimension can exist, we cannot assume, for example, that the growth of intension (2) of all the terms is automatic, and that certain tendencies, or formations produce automatically meanings by extension. If we talk about the dimension, or some kind of expansion, or enlarging possibility, we do not talk about any sensible contents of a process, or deal with any meaning.
However, our thought is connected closely to the human mind, which we believe to be participating to the whole progressive development of the universe, and which - as we believe - can be regarded as an inseparable part of the internal essence of the whole universe, as we have discussed before. Let us remind that we have also discussed the human mind as an external sign, too, which is a carrier. But we cannot prove anything. In spite of this I want to propose for that the dimension thought is connected to human consciousness, too, and it is the business of future to prove this to be true or false.
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1. ( Vorticism : The philosophical theory of vortex (vortices); in older theories of the universe, especially that of Descartes, (cosmic matter carried round in) rapid rotate movement round center or axis, supposed to account for origin and phenomena of terrestrial and other systems.)
2. ( Intension : (logic) connotation of a term, sum of the attributes, qualities comprised in a concept. Also: Intensity, high degree, of a quality, opposite to extension; stenuous exertion of mind or will.)
[25]
We can easily see that C.S. Peirce has tried to join functionally together both dimension and thought, and especially that part of the function of thought, which is able to create space, to where our thought can expand itself, as well as he has emphasized the processes which make connections between ideas and can create new configurations, and by which we can have the phenomenon of consciousness and by which there shall become to existence the phenomenon of human mind. But for the reason of the function of the thought and dimension, there does not exist, one and only principle, by which the whole reality shall be arranged, but several ways, and stages, by which things shall be arranged, and re-arranged. As the result of them we can get us something which is quite independent of the processes by which the result is produced. But far more important than thought and dimension as such, are the possibilities of varieties, and potentialities, and in the same time there must become to existence more sophisticated thought, by which all of these enlarging varieties and potentialities can be developed and expanded to triadic connections, as well as rise them up to different levels, too.
Sixth , Spinoza has emphasized that we are migrating our faint selves to a kind of a larger self (there are larger cosmic processes, to which we shall join when we have joined our faint selves to another self, which is more complicated, and whose nature is to assimilate selves into it), and when we have reached those selves, we shall loose our egoistic ways of being, and by which we become able to reflect the world. I think that C.S. Peirce has derived his idea of the larger cosmic nature of symbolic process from Spinoza - especially when discussing the theme of all the components flowing together. But there were also other philosophers who tried to find traces which seemed to prove that there is something in the universe by its own, as a filed of possibility, which is just making possible the existence of larger selves.
From the first ENCY (NOTES 34) we get to know that also JOSIAH Royce tried to find an evidence from an absolute, whose essence is just being in the universe. Royce began from fragmentary experiences, and was forced to conclude that there is a larger self, but also that there might be present an error, too. Despite the presence of that error he concluded that there might be the absolute truth. According him, mind is such an ultimate reality which no subjective consciousness can recognize, because of their subjectivity. But despite of this - there must be present an absolute experience, because mind is the total intellectual structure of the universe.
In the absolute experience all the things are present, as well as we can understand every finite experience in that very moment. I think that this is just the same which we know from C.S. Peirce, namely that there must indeed to be something before any human enterprise, despite of the fact that we cannot reach those spheres right now. In his synechism, C.S. Peirce (NOTES 35) has used both an expression pure and infinitive Self, as well as the the expression poor individual self - when dealing with spiritual dimensions of man. From I. Scheffler (NOTES 36) we have got to known that - according to C.S. Peirce :
" we have a self which is not predetermined and which is not an entity, but it is developed in social contexts and will reach itself to the context and later outside of it. And further, the spiritual development of the (larger) self needs a vision which is more than any (temporal) self has at a certain moment in itself ".
[26]
But there are other references to self. When dealing with the human consciousness, and its processes C.S. Peirce (NOTES 37) has used the expressions "self" and "not-self", which are opposite poles of the double-consciousness, which we shall discuss later in the current study. There is an idea of development, and also an idea of processes. This tendency of thinking is especially clear with W. James (NOTES 38) who has described the development of self as a chain of past selves, or as series of experiences, or feelings and thoughts. Moreover, James (NOTES 39) has explained in his Principles that spiritualists held that self is the same thing as immortal soul. When thinking James' philosophy, we can be sure, that this kind of an idea was not among his own favorites - because of his emphasis of developing self, which dies after new version of it comes into existence.
But what about the nature of things, which can be regarded as objects of our intellectual, or perceptual operations? What is their existential status? Have they characters, and have we any influence to them? From W. Percy (NOTES 40) we get to know that - according to C.S. Peirce :
" there are real things out there whose characters are independent of our opinions of them ".
I think, that this does not refer to something which has been as it HAS BEEN FOUND , but instead to something, which IS as it is, because there are no alternatives. Our knowledge is not something before objects, but it is not due of objects, either. This citation above refers to an existential status of iconic level, ot that there is something, which can exist even without human specie.
The way, by which we apprehend something, may be due to the different icons (1), which, in turn, are an inseparable part of objects. We may suppose that, at least, that things, and some of icons have been in there before we have had any conception of them. Do not be so astonished with this, and not so full of human megalomany. Have we anything to do, or have we any role in the world evolution is an interesting question, but the possible answer depends of our own choices. The world is not as ready made as it seems to be, where there are certain prerequisites of actions, and where the mind is something independent of our temporality, and are we confronting fixed, and independent objects, or not. The truth, or result may be, that we shall never fully understanding their nature? And if so, the higher levels are there for some other species, and we are only loosing the whole universe. In human mind, there can be large references, as well as unites, to which carrier-signs have also referred to, when acting. From that reason, we tend to apprehend most things and objects as corresponding complexity, as to which references still seem to be suggesting - and as unites, when our object seems to have that property only. However, they might be, in fact, quite simple, as in the simple levels of feelings, because they cannot be something more. There are no secrets behind every experience, or idea. But in the same time we may make complex operations also with them. This is the case especially when we are striving for create something into more complex social settings, for which things themselves are not oriented to by their original nature. We must fill all the black spots with complex meanings, according our human nature. It may still be the fact that most of our complexity is quite illusory. But still some of these introduced new tendencies, which we have produced by our actions - are producing more general tendencies, and habits - which are adding our importance, and writing a manuscript to the role of human mind in the development of the whole universe.
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1. (According to C.S. Peirce, in the development of mind, there can be different types of icons in different stages. One of them is the stage of qualisigns. At the second stage, there are iconic sinsigns [individual habits to describe cases with diagrams]. At the third stage there can appear iconic legisigns [which is a generalized characteristica]. However, during the whole progression symbols are an inseparable part of the internal nature of object (Peirce 1966, 228, 230))
[27]
For all of those reasons, it makes no sense to talk about any substances, or given, and for some unknown reason forever staying features in the world, even if we are referring to icons and diagrams, which may be temporal, or, perhaps, something to be developed to fulfill a temporal, and finite potentiality, but they can also be forerunners of law to come, or mind.
We just do not know. Hence, we are not connected with things, as they are, but we should behave with them as they might become to existence by their potentialities, and we should concentrate to our feelings of them, or to our sense of their immediacy, and then reflect them over and over thereafter. The whole human experience, and the altersensing and the medisensing departments of mind, in turn, are continuously changing and vivid ones, were their contents recollected or directly experienced. The philosophical problem which we have there is that we cannot be sure if there are any, or even enough potentialities by which to join the world together. In fact - we cannot be sure that there are any potentialities, or final ends. Instead we may have some illusory expectations, which don't have any chance to be realized. As an example we can wait for a kind of miracle to save us from Apocalypse Now . And if we are trying to propose for that all this our world is like chaos instead, we must reckon that from this we cannot develop any sophisticated system of mind, or anything complex - but only accidental forms, which do not mean anything. Of course we can admit that there is a lot of vivid essence in the world. But there are also alternatives to these tendencies of vivid essence. If we think e.g. mathematics, we cannot change even its eternal prerequisites by no way, namely those which make mathematics possible to exist and develop further. This is just the way of life of mathematics. If we make those changes, we have dealing with something else than mathematics - or we are interpreting it in a new way, or arguing: let there be this kind of mathematics with its brave new world (which unfortunately is not the same as we actually have). But if we accept the vividness of the whole world as a "general" principle, we must accept its consequences, too. One of the most decisive of them is that we cannot have any formal structures, or that we are able to have only a relatively fixed structures, or general cosmic features.
When C.S. Peirce (NOTES 41) introduced his doctrine of synechism, he proposed for that one consequence of the doctrine is that we are not permitted to say that even the sum of the angles of a triangle exactly equals two right angles - but instead we can say that it equal that quantity plus or minus some quantity which we excessively small for all triangles can measure. But this does not suggest to that the sum of angles were now this, and then that, and that the difference between measures is so great that there is not any more a valid general rule, or principle which to apply in measuring angles. Another consequence of the doctrine is that we are not allowed to claim that space has strict accurately three dimensions but instead that any movements of bodies out of three dimensions are at most exceedingly minute. But are we now dealing with fundamental truths of mathematics? Yes, and no.
The answer is yes, if we consider mathematical sentences as such concepts which have certain practical bearings - namely that hey are followed other kind of sentences as predicted, and that with them we can test hypotheses. But we can also say no because we are discussing only certain kind of consequences, and of hypotheses, which are not directly concerning the essence of the live departments of the world evolution, as well as the consequences of the doctrine of synechism in that respect. In a good reason, we could make a hypothesis that the Euclidean Geometry is valid only and only if treated in its own, and restricted context, within which we can determine with appropriate concepts. But applying synechism to the geometry in question, we ought to make Euclidean system only a borderline case, which has almost nothing to do with living world.
[28]
But we cannot conclude from our principles not much what the world is like, but only their consequences, or what kind of views we can get by them. This is the very heart of pragmatism - that we create hypotheses only to get different conclusions. We can have a view which says that tomorrow the whole mankind shall die and vanish, or shall be fixed to the everlasting round-and-round circle - because just tomorrow is shall reach its ultimate end. There is only a dirty man with his donkey in the middle of a desert wondering why all the people were hurrying with their cars to the south, and why the weather has become so cloudy, and the sky so dark. But this is not a hypothesis, only a prognose, and there are no special conclusions to be drawn, except stop wars, and violence. But if we put the question so that there is a cause - whatever cause it were - from whose consequence the whole mankind meets its end relatively soon, we can study the reason of our life, ethics, and other similar questions. There are then consequences which are important, not a theory, or a good story of our future. Let us remind how C.S. Peirce (NOTES 42) has emphasized in his doctrine of synechism - that:
" a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe, as a whole ".
This is not insisting that man shall reach this state in distant future, but instead that man has this opportunity - it is not a kind of automatic process, or inevitable state of things at future, whether we strive for it, or not. According the pragmatic maxim we must trace if there might be consequences of our concepts. It might seem, that we ought to think, what kind of object we are studying, having this or that strategy, but this is not important - only what are the consequences of our propositions concerning them, whatever they were in their secret inner nature.
But have objects any consequences as they are? That is: can they have any consequences in themselves, as totally left out of any control? Instead of studying objects, we might suppose that when giving different explanations, we might, or might not have the same object, but this is not important in the current stage. Some of our explanations which ww have derived from consequences might be wrong, which has several correcting consequences, when we have got better explanations, but not before. However, the question is not of the absolute rightness or wrongness but instead: have our concepts any practical bearings, whatever our concepts are like, or what kind of strategy we shall have if they have some consequences. We must remember that there might be several consequences even if we have we wrong explanation at hand, and that those consequences shall vary a lot when we are advancing to find out the among of wrongness. Accepting synechism as a common and valid principle, we cannot say that there are such and such kind of valid objects, from which we can get only one kind of explanations. Instead, we might suppose, that when we are dealing with valid explanations, with their valid objects, we are in close contact with the truths within both of them, if they have any. Because of that very principle of closeness, it might be true that we cannot strictly speak about totally independent objects, because we cannot even prove that such totally independent objects never exist, or shall ever become to existence - due of their lack of communication, or ours. And what comes to mathematical truths, in general, some of them might be true only if we have certain scope to them, or a point of view - and then they may be regarded as truths of their own kind - if there is a world which is their like.
Then there is the question the goal of an absolute accuracy, which we must reject, and instead accept that most truths are relative - which does not mean their weakness, or that they were false - but instead their readyness to be valid in quite different kind of futures, and an ability to master more complete modes of communication. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 43) has argued for certain non-materiality of the laws of universe in his general psychognosy (1), which we shall discuss at the end of the current study in detail. There is an idea that future shall be that kind, and not based on materia. There are several consequences especially the reason of maintaining purely material values. It is very easy to show that we do not have that future at hand, yet, because nobody seems to be willing to live without his material welfare, and toys. During the current chapter we have known by C.W. Morris (NOTES 44) about his concept of human mind - as well as the we have discussed the concepts of thought and idea, which are also corresponding terms to eternal laws - according Platonian realism.
But did C.S. Peirce try to prove an idealistic interpretation to be true? Definitely not, but he didn't try to prove any other school of philosophy as valid, either. His view is not something which emphasizes nothing-but interpretation of the world, or something which wants to deny all which is other kind of quality. He has insisted only that some of [our] ideas have consequences, and that most important of them have them, because it is a prerequisite of their true existence. And in general - this is the way, by which things will happen, and that our ideas, which have consequences, have their role in the general development of the universe, too. Nothing more, or less.
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1. ( Gnosis : Knowledge of spiritual mysteries, e.g. in the sect of gnosticism.)
[29]
But next I'm going to study Kant's philosophy - because of he had the concept substance in his ontology, too, and because C.S. Peirce has told to be taken some ideas from Kant. But what about "taking"? In general, this concept is just as illusory as somebody had made possible the phenomenon named "calculating" in general. But it is just a custom to say that one takes an idea from another. Even if you were an extreme materialist, you can claim that somebody has "taken", or "derived an idea" from you. There is quite seldom question of material things. And if we try to apply the principle of synechism there, it is not possible to avoid "deriving ideas" from somebody else - just because the social nature of our concepts and symbols.
Anyway. Few words about Kant's ideas of trancendence, and of his philosophical stages.There are two of Kant's terms, between which he made differentiation, namely transcendent (1), and transcendental (2) - which differentation din't make e.g. such transcendental philosohers as Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. There are several other meanings between the terms by other philosophers which seem to be quite near to the interpretation by Kant, but which have different emphasis - admitting only that something goes beyond ordinary limit, and that there is just something a priori in experience (3). In Kant's philosophy, there are the two different stages , namely the pre-critical and critical ones. In the former stage he argued for that it is possible to get information of substance by the reason. He was convicted, too, that it is possible to give an ontological (4) proof of the existence of God.
At this stage he got a lot of influences from Isaac Newton's physics to his studies in natural philosophy. In the latter stage Kant was influenced by English Locke (5) and his empirism (6), which was the reason that he rejected his earlier speculations, as well as that he rejected the idea that we can get to know information of substances. But what kind of denied substances? Are there similarities to Scottish Hume (7), who has argued for that there are no substances at all outside our experience? But for what Hume referred by substances? Hume (NOTES 45) has argued for that all of our perceptions are different from each other, and that they are different from everything else in the universe, too. He regarded them distinct and separable, and suggested that they have a separate existence, and that they do not need anything else to support their existence. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance. This suggests to, that for Hume substances were not just hypothetical, but instead an essential part of our perceptual world, or that world itself, and something fundamentally human.
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1. ( Transcendent : Transcending, altogether outside, unrealizable in, experience, out there.)
2. ( Transcendental : Not derived from experience, a priori)
3. (Other philosophical meanings: Transcendent : That transcends ordinary limit, pre-eminent, supreme, extraordinary - Transcendental: The meaning of the term generally based on recognition of a priori element in experience.)
4. ( Ontology : Department of metaphysics, concerned with the essence of things, or being in the abstract.)
5. ((1632-1704); JOHN LOCKE was the English empirical philosopher, who had great influence on 18th-c. philosophy in general; and especially, he was an author of Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (1690), and Two Treatises of Government (1690). In his Some Thought on Education (1693), he discussed on education, and emphasized that an educator must take in account the natural development of a child, and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), in which he discussed on the philosophy and religion. Well-known is an idea of soul as tabula rasa at its birth, which has first been introduced by THOMAS AQUINAS, who also regarded senses as the source of knowledge: " nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu ".)
6. ( Empirism : A philosophical meaning; refers to philosophical doctrines - cf. empiricism, which is relying on science)
7. ((1711-1776); DAVID HUME was the Scottish philosopher, and author of Treatise of Human Nature , and of The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1750). In his system of philosophical scepticism, human knowledge is restricted to the experience of ideas and impressions, and ultimate verification of their truth or falsehood is impossible. He regarded his scepticism merely academic, however.)
[30]
Kant expressed his new epistemology in his Kritik der reinen Vernuft (1781), which can be regarded as a reaction to English empirism. But Kant was not a pure empirist, and, perhaps, not at all empiricist (1), at least in his critical stage - instead he believed that we can surely become acquainted with true knowledge just by knowing, and we should take advantage with mind such things, by which can preserve, and maintain that knowledge. There are certain similarities to C.S. Peirce's ideas concerning human mind, and thought as something, which have principles of their own, and not direct connections to sensational world. But the very start of knowledge, and total immediacy we have when perceiving something in its continuity.
Hence, the only thing that Kant accepted from English empirism (e.g. by Locke) was that all our knowledge gets start from experience. But he emphasized that we cannot explain the essence of our knowledge just by our experiences, notwithstanding that there is a kind of reality which is produced by phenomena, which our experiences concern. But just by becoming acquaintance with that reality we cannot directly comprehend, that is, Das Ding an sich, or explain how the knowledge is, when being as it is, but which an essence we get from the mind a priori (2), we reach the true source of our general knowledge. There are such things as mathematics, which is a priori ; it is derived from the mind, and not from experience. Mostly this is the same which C.S. Peirce had argued for, when discussing e.g. his synechism, and general psychognosy, namely, that there must be something above our presence, and that man has his true nature in other spheres than concreteness of material things. In his Metaphysische Anfangsrude der Naturwissenschaft (1786) Kant also dealt with knowing and its nature.
But now we don't discuss the topic of knowing [as something from its own nature] no longer, but instead some other similarities between Kant and pragmatism - notwithstanding that they are studied by many commentators before. From Dewey (NOTES 46) we know that C.S. Peirce took the term pragmatism from Kant, who made the clear difference between the terms pragmatisch (3), and praktisch (4); referring probably with the latter to something which has already an existence, and which we can use, and with which we can carry on practice. C.S. Peirce referred with the former to something, with which we can derive e.g. practical bearings of concepts. We can find the differentiation in Kant's Metaphysic of Morals , where the first term refers to the rules of function, and to the techniques which are common in human experience, and which we are able to change. Hence, the term pragmatisch is conducted to our everyday life. The latter term refers to the general moral laws and rules - which are a priori in their nature, and which we cannot prove to be true by human activities, and from which we cannot derive easily any consequences. Instead - we must obey them, or accommodate our "behavior" to their nature, when we confront them, because they are waiting us as a kind of omen , or as our destiny at a near, or more distant future. Man cannot remove any ot these rules, but man can decide to stop obeying them, nothing more - which is the same as somebody stops eating. It is not so easy to differentiate pragmatic and practical activities according to their moral properties. In fact, we can do a lot of harm by testing the consequences of our concepts by pragmatic orientation. If some of our concepts do no cause anything, we may evaluate them to be for nothing, for example.
In general, there is quite a similar emphasis of the role of morality [as well as aesthetics and ethics] in the philosophies of C.S. Peirce and Kant - when considering things, which are out of experience of our senses, or when considering things which are going to be realized at higher levels, or at future.
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1. ( Empiricism : The practice of relying on observation and experiment, especially in the natural sciences.)
2. ( A priori : (Reasoning) from cause to effect; deductive(ly). [Tr. L., = 'from what is before'.)
3. ( Pragmatic [pragmatisch] - pragmatism: philosophical doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests; concerned with practical results and values; treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.)
4. ( Practical [praktisch]: Concerned with, shown in practice; available, useful, in practice; engaged in practice [like religion, aesthetics, ethics, some doctrines of philosophy, etc.] - having already an existence for utilizing, or revealing it without human efforts.)
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But what about C.S. Peirce's own, written opinions of Kant? From the letter, which C.S. Peirce mailed to Mario Calderoni, which has been written approximately in 1905 (NOTES 47), we get to know that C.S. Peirce has got also other philosophical influences from Kant. But he never told exactly which were the very ideas he "took" from him. In addition to this, he emphasized just at this letter that the essence of pragmaticism was to be a philosophical method (that is just the term pragmatisch stands for). A.J. Ayer (NOTES 48) has written that C.S. Peirce appreciated the way how Kant linked knowing to the constitution of the human mind, and accepted the way by which Kant restricted the field of experience which is possible to man.
Here and there in C.S. Peirce's philosophy we can meet the similar idea of insufficiency of man's present knowledge, or that man only has been interpreting instead of using final, and accurate signs, or that man has only a [restricted] rôle in the world evolution, but man is not a star in it. There is no need to test any concept if they already have their final form. But who tells us which are such concepts, or how near we are them now, or how we can be absolutely sure if we have some final concepts in use? This is extremely difficult because of the continuity of the (human) world which cannot be changed into its elementary fragments for viewing them. Or if done so, the result is not just a copy from an original experience, but something more complicated, and sophisticated.
One of these restriction is how man apprehends time.. From I. Gullvåg (NOTES 49) we know that especially in C.S. Peirce's late philosophy, it has been an important thesis that time is both a continuum and [by virtue of its infinite divisibly] , and an infinity which we actually apprehend. We can see something like compact - which is NOT that kind, but instead like fractals which reveals ennumerous details notwithstanding that we are approaching its "kernel" forever, and ever. Gullvåg has referred to Chance, Love and Logic (NOTES 50), too, but he didn't associate this C.S. Peirce's view to Kantian tendency, to which direction it suggests to. This is the case especially when we think the general meanings of the terms intuition (1), and continuum (2), and the special emphasis which both philosophers have had in their discussions - especially when explaining the essence of time, or the apprehension of time. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 51) has both criticized and interpreted Kant's conceptions on the time and continuity - admitting that Kant was quite right when saying that every partitioning in time is time itself but he didn't understand quite well what he was proposing for, saying that time, in itself, is infinite, and that it does not consist of infinitely divisible parts. Hence, he did not made differentiation between two things. First : how we apprehend time, and second : what time itself is, in its infinite divisibly. Thought, Kant did not understand that there must take in consideration two different ideas concerning time - the one, which says that time, as intuited - can never be divided so that parts were times themselves - and the another, which says that in time there might be still something which can cause that we cannot reach all of its infinite divisible parts, as they are. Kant translated the Latin term intuitus into the German Anschauung , which could cause this misinterpretation. But what is the consequences of this? Although we can say that time is e.g. infinite divisible, or that we can have an intuition that it as indivisible - we cannot master it at all - but we can only speculate, and make hypotheses concerning its essence, and ways of being! When considering Kant's proposition as a whole, C.S. Peirce has suggested to that the conclusion of those two considerations should be that time, as intuited, has no separate parts. Kant did not illustrate the essence of [the whole] time, as such, whatever it is, or shall be. This kind a view of time as an un-analyzable object C.S. Peirce accepted, too, and suggested that his own concept of percipuum (3) is quite the same as Kant's concept Anschauung, in this sense. But the term has also been used by Edmund Husserl, indicating to the principle of principles, which refers to all which is directly given, or seen.
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1. ( Intuition : Immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning, or immediate apprehension by sense, or immediate insight.)
2. ( Continuum : A whole, the structure of whose parts is continuous and not atomic.)
3. ( Percipuum : A finite-like target of observation, which is actually infinite, and indivisible. Cf. especially the meaning of Perceive: Apprehend with the mind.)
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There is an interesting association to Wittgenstein in this question, too. From Gullvåg (NOTES 52) we know that Wittgenstein's argumentation that we do not grasp the infinity of time, or time as an infinitely divisible continuum - as a real extension, but only as a possibility, an intension. That is - we can give a name to a phenomenon "time", and associate it to several other groups of names, and enlarge its intension to the world of meaning - in spite of that we have not been able to restrict and map our target in a definite way.
Gullvåg suggested for that this argument was a reaction to C.S. Peirce's opinion concerning continuity of time, but, in fact, it does not add anything to it, or try to deny it, either. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 53) has emphasized, too, that there is not at all such thing as absolute immediacy, or something which were absolutely present, either accidentally or by confrontation. There we have, his doctrine of synechism - again - which means that we cannot escape thirdness, by which principle the [three] classes of mind are synthesized together. This very principle suggest to the fact that it is impossible to explain anything in its separate way of being, as a separate object, or as thing an sich - because the explanation is a second phase, or restructuring continuous but we may have an illusion that something separate is explained.
This is not a kind of geometric structure, or an illustration, according with the whole world consist of triangles - But instead a way to describe this phenomenon. We must clearly admit, too, that only by calculus we cannot overcome the world. The synthesizing tendency of mind and thought is necessary because there must be a new arrangement of elements before any understanding, and it must be independent from them. This is just because our thought needs to get rid of the presence of infinite, and still self-circulating finite-like continuums, and instead of it must build a new world.
But there are laws in certain, potential sense BEFORE they are fulfilled, and there must be much more that that, too. That is, the world of ideas is not the result of man's own enterprises, but something before - but not completely applicable, yet. We can conclude that there are perhaps more similarities between Kant and C.S. Peirce but we don't discuss them in detail any more, but instead some topics concerning Hegel's philosophy: He named his whole doctrine by the name absolute idealism, which stands contrary to Kant's and Fichte's [and some others'] more restricted subjective idealism.
Hegel considered the whole universe, as the system, which has been developing within one time system. Hence, the totality is, and will be able to give the whole meaning to its parts. Different ages follow each other in that one main system - as a dialectic continuum. The history, as a whole, can be considered as the manifestation of the eternal truth or Geist. But that manifestation takes time, and also ideas are, perhaps, at the beginning very dim ones [we cannot be sure if this phenomenon is only local, or an exception]. The great question is: Must there be somebody, who is capable to start immediately something more complicated, because that one is more developed? Is this necessary? And what if there are no more development in any corner of the "world" as the blind staff, or less that that? No hope or faith, or knowledge?
Hegel used, as his tool, the dialectical method which was developed already by Plato and Zeno (1). All of them supposed that we can elevate to the true world of ideas, by uncovering the contradictions of beings.
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1. ((c. 300 B.C.); ZENO [of Citium] was the Greek philosopher, and the founder of Stoic school.)
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We can find the kernel of Hegel's philosophy is in his work Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-1816). It is almost impossible to put all the contents of Hegel's philosophy in a nutshell. However, he derived some of his ideas from Kant, especially when developing his idea of antinomies (1), to which direction our reason is continuously drifting. But Hegel considered these antinomies as existing in the objective reality. His interpretation was that out of our immediate sight there are some guidelines, or reason, before any actualization - But not as Thomas Aquinas have put it - that when something is taking place, materia gets its form. According to Hegel, the purpose of his positive dialectics, was to synthesize the antinomies and conflicts so, that there would be quite new and harmonic solution. For the problems which will arise due to them, Hegel introduced his negative dialectics. Hence, there was the leading idea of a dialogical solution in Hegel's whole epistemology. There were different dialogical solutions available to be applied to the philosophy of nature, and on the other to be applied to the Philosophy of Geist, because of the difference of their very nature. Hegel's world seems to be consisting of different, but still interacting elements, even in its higher levels, as an example antinomies, and contradictions, but also of different materials, from which they are made of, and the only answer to every problem was just a dialog. No blind fighting with each others any more, or blind tendencies, or origins from nothing.
But there is a difficulty, at least, which says that there are lot of things which cannot be solved with any kind of dialog, especially what concerns the development of society. But Hegel's philosophy is a good philosophy for the rationally behaving world with its rational beings, who are not destroying themselves with all their tools, because it is silly, and who are not avoiding conversations, because they offer solutions. Unfortunately our own world, as we know pretty well, is a self-destructive one, or at least human beings have that characteristic, and that our branch of sciences are not migrating themselves towards a state of harmony. When thinking our history, it seems to me that only in Hegel's own epistemology its concepts and ideas are supporting each other.
But why Hegel is so important there? Just because there was also the American Hegelian philosophy - phenomenon, which probably influenced to some pragmatists, too. Few words about its history. According the first ENCY (NOTES 54) the role of W. T. Harris in the development of the American Hegelian philosophy was a considerable one. He argumented for abstract philosophy emphasizing the superiority of speculative method in relation to the methods of empirism, and positivism (2), and also to the view of agnosticism (3). Harris, and his counterparts, thought that only with pure reason it would be possible to get knowledge concerning an ultimate reality, and especially that Hegelian philosophy should offer a world view which could be widely acceptable, and which could be applied to ethics, religion, arts, politics, law and pedagogic. According The third ENCY (NOTES 55) Harris studied at the first stage at Yale College Platonian philosophy, but he was not satisfied with the teaching style of that College, and soon he began his studying in St. Louis. There he met Brockmeyer (4). Since 1858 Harris, Brockmeyer and some other philosophers began to meet each others in Kant Club, and Harris also got a copy from Hegel's study on logic and encouraged Brockmeyer to translate in into English - but who made only some outlines for translation. In 1886 it was founded St. Louis Philosophical Society, whose